Ahmed Rashid: Afghanistan and Pakistan after the Western pullout

Speaking last night at a joint SOAS/Pakistan Society lecture, the author Ahmed Rashid painted a predictably gloomy picture of the future for Afghanistan, and even more so for Pakistan. Although there was much in his analysis which seems to make sense, some of his observations about the current state of play were surprising and call for further comment.

The danger to Afghanistan at this juncture is perfectly clear. The political institutions have remained half-baked and prone to corruption. The President, Hamid Karzai, has been reluctant to prevent a culture of bribery and criminality in the highest echelons of the Afghan state. He has proved to be a vacillating leader, interested in leaving a legacy but not sure what it should be, or how to go about it. The legitimacy of the Kabul government amongst the people is not strong. The withdrawal of Western forces threatens the Afghan economy – much of the employment has been dependent on the presence of foreign institutions and aid donors, and without it many educated Afghans will be jobless. No significant economy beyond this field has developed over the last 12 years. The army and police forces are not reliable to enforce security or unity. The absence of Western forces will allow the Taliban or other actors to take over the government in the south and east of the country. Extremist movements, such as Laskhar-i Taiba, which were originally associated with Pakistan, are now operating more freely in Afghanistan and linking together with similar Central Asian movements. The neighbouring powers are not yet deeply involved in the conflict, but should one choose to enter the fray, then a conflagration involving Russia, Central Asia, Iran, Pakistan and India in Afghanistan is certainly not impossible.

There is as great a danger for Pakistan. The absence of a visible enemy – the West – on Afghan soil could encourage the extremist movements to be more ambitious in bringing about their objectives of an Islamic state in the region and the overthrow of the current government in Pakistan. Terrorism in Pakistan has recently been on the increase, with indiscriminate bombings and the murder of senior officials calculated to demoralise the population. The region has not come to terms with the fact that the West will be withdrawing from the region shortly, and that the age of “Fixing Failed States” is coming to an end. Rather than the elites of the region looking to the West to bail them out and support them whilst they themselves refuse to solve the underlying problems and stand on their own two feet is a fair and important comment. Indeed, the West itself, wearied by intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, not to mention Libya, is perhaps not questioning itself about the consequences of losing interest in intervention – greater repression and the development of new dictatorships are the likely results.

Thus far, the analysis seems good. However, some of Rashid’s other statements, as I said earlier, were surprising:

1. He said that the question of a military transition was relatively unimportant. What matters over the next four months is an election which is seen to be free and fair. A government legitimised by the democratic process was a necessity for any future negotiation with the Taliban. If the next election is rigged or seen to be without legitimacy, that might act as the catalyst for a new civil war which could be worse than that of the 1990s and spiral into regional conflict.

2. He suggested that the US withdrawal would cause the “peace party” within the Afghan Taliban to swell. The Taliban were now more understanding of the needs of a modern state and government than they had been in the 1990s. They were reconciled to allowing cosmopolitan and relatively free cities, recognising that they were necessary drivers of economic growth and prosperity. Indeed, the older generation of the Afghan Taliban who had lived through the Jihad of the 1980s and the Civil War of the 1990s, followed by the post 2001 exile were eager to come to a settlement and return to a peaceful existence.

3. Pakistan had lost interest in the old doctrine of “Strategic Depth” – a Great Game style notion, whereby they would be the de facto ruler of the south of Afghanistan up to the Hindu Kush (including Kabul, Ghazni and Kandahar), and call on this territory in the event of any major conflict with India. Pakistan had lost any interest in attempting to govern in Afghanistan or project its hegemony there. This, indeed, was confirmed by a representative of the Pakistan High Commission who was also present.

4. He also suggested that, although this was difficult to verify by concrete research, many of the ordinary inhabitants of FATA (the tribal areas in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (the former North Western Frontier Province of Pakistan) actually welcomed the use of drone strikes against extremist militant leaders who had caused much misery in these areas over the last few years.

One might append a few comments to these points:

1. It seems strange to put democratic elections ahead of the question of a secure military handover. Without the apparatus of security, no state in Afghanistan is going to be able to preserve itself against the many players who wish to overthrow or disregard it. A successful democratic election is hardly going to overawe extremists or external actors who do not consider an election – free and fair or otherwise – as a means of legitimating a government.

2. It seems incredible that the Taliban is going to allow a free cosmopolitanism in the Afghan cities – it would be completely against its essence. One only has to look at the vile and idiotic bombing of the Taverna du Liban in Kabul yesterday to see this. The Taliban is in essence an outgrowth of the historic conflict between the conservative countryside and the cosmopolitan cities in Afghanistan, and if the Taliban forsakes this idea it forsakes one of the very basic tenets of its identity.

3. Perhaps this is in truth the case, but if so it would be a change of policy overturning hundreds of years of geo-politics. The regional power based in the Indian subcontinent has always tried to control Afghanistan up to the Hindu Kush.

4. Perhaps the ordinary people of FATA do welcome drone strikes against militant leaders, but one wishes it were easier to understand their wishes. I asked Rashid whether Pakistan’s new-found interest in seeing an independent and stable Afghanistan extended to offering a negotiated settlement of the troubled question of the “Durand Line” – the outdated frontier established by the British in 1893 which is one of the basic generators of instability in the FATA Tribal Region as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan (see my articles here and here) – but unfortunately, according to Rashid, there is no particular interest in dealing with this fundamental problem. As I relate in my articles, the British who set up the line in the 1890s foresaw that it was basically ungovernable and that hot pursuit would have to be allowed to maintain its security – i.e. that something along the lines of drone strikes would happen sooner or later. A frontier constituted in such a way is hardly the basis for generating modern and secure states.

Regardless of these points, we should consider what Rashid says about the end of the era of Western intervention, especially in the region. The West may have behaved carelessly or criminally in many respects, but their presence has provided a scapegoat for enemies and a support to a fragile order. In the West’s absence, more extreme forms of government could well develop, and it is necessary to ask if the moral ease which the West gains from refusing to interfere in affairs which it considers not its own is ultimately the right option, both in terms of moral as well as practical correctness.



The border that never was – the Durand Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan

It is difficult for outsiders to understand the depth of feeling and sense of national injustice that possesses Afghans when they cross – or even consider – the Durand line, the line defining the southern border of Afghanistan drawn by the British Raj and the Afghan King in 1893. A foreigner crossing at any of the passes that pierce the Hindu Kush between Afghanistan and Pakistan will be harangued by Afghans on the iniquity of what they consider a colonial imposition and be assured that the tribal territories of Pakistan belong to Afghanistan. It is a fact of Afghan political life that someone suggesting  recognising the Line also commits political suicide.

The US Government’s affirmation in October of the current configuration of the Durand Line  has added vigour to a long-running debate about its practicality and worth. Established in an 1893 treaty between British India and Afghanistan, the Line has been troubled from the start. It has been a cause of upset for Afghans as it cuts through the middle of the Pashtun heartland, Afghanistan’s dominant ethnic group. Kabul has long cherished the idea of bring all Pashtuns back under its aegis, and Afghan governments since independence have agitated for the Line to be redrawn. In the 1960s the Afghans upped the ante by proposing the creation of a state of Pashtunistan, thus implying the break-up of the Pakistani state. Partly on this account, it has been the scene of endless cross-border intrusions by both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The two countries came close to war in 1948 and again in1960. One reason why Pakistan feels driven to intervene in Afghanistan via its Taliban proxies is through its long-term feeling of insecurity about the frontier. The present raids by Pakistani Taliban and retaliation by US drone strikes are just the latest chapter in interference by either side over the frontier which goes back to the end of the 19th century.

Recently in the FT, Javid Ahmad (“Securing the Durand Line could bring peace to Afghanistan”, FT 5 November) recently argued that the border should be secured. The Afghan Government should finally recognise the Line. The weak parts should be fenced and mined to prevent the infiltration of militants and drug smugglers, and full travel documents should be issued to allow cross-border travel with appropriate security checks. Yet, as sensible and obvious as this idea sounds, there is no possibility that it would deliver the desired result of peace. To understand why, we must look at the intentions of the Line’s creators.

The Durand Line is a child of the Great Game, the Anglo-Russian rivalry for dominance of Central Asia in the 19th century. Britain’s first consideration for drawing a frontier between India and Afghanistan was not the practical convenience of governing the territory, but obtaining defensible forward positions in the mountain passes to guard against any Russian attack via Afghanistan. Hence, the frontier cuts through not only Pashtun tribes, but even through villages. The Line is convoluted, and in many places unclear without any physical features to support it. The difficulties of securing it along its predominantly mountainous 1,900-mile length render such a solution practically impossible.

The fact that Britain was so cavalier about drawing a border which could not be practically administered springs from an important fact. The Durand Line was never intended by its creators to be an international sovereign border. It was only a line beyond which either side was bound not to extend its influence or send their troops. The British never intended to extend regular sovereignty and government up to the line. British Indian sovereignty ended at the foothills of the frontier. In the 10,000 square miles of the mountainous Pashtun tribal areas, tribes were either left to administer their own affairs, or were in certain areas governed by a mixture of often barbaric tribal custom – women are still used as currency to settle vendettas between clans – and British martial law (the “Frontier Crimes Regulation”) which is for the most part contrary to international norms of human rights. For example, government officials – the romantically named “Tribal Agents” – have powers of arbitrary arrest and detention, hearsay evidence may be used in the makeshift courts, and the accused has no right to a lawyer. This situation has continued with little variation to this day.

British officials of the 19th century even foresaw the need for hot pursuit across the frontier from the Afghan side. In 1897, Sir Denis Fitzpatrick, Governor General of the Punjab wrote that there would be places on the frontier “where it would be difficult for us to prevent the tribes from raiding on [Afghan] territory and in which accordingly we should in a proper case have to allow the [Afghans] to counter-raid…”. The current use of US and UK drone strikes across the frontier would in no way have surprised the old administrators of the Raj.

This line of control, which was an answer to a 19th century colonial problem, has no place in a 21st century world. A border which its creators foresaw would require hot pursuit and which was not designed to be a practically administrable international sovereign boundary line cannot be successfully administered as such. The current settlement, which holds the Pakistani tribal territories in the legal limbo of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, prevents the effective rule of law or any prospect of external investment in those areas. In fact, it is part of the cause of Afghanistan’s instability in the first place. The chronic lack of education, infrastructure and employment in the Pakistani Tribal territories is a result of the current configuration of the Durand Line and the territories’ legal isolation. These conditions make the inhabitants easy fodder for radicalisation. This isolation also favours elements of the Pakistani intelligence services, who use these areas hidden away from international scrutiny to prepare covert operations in Afghanistan as well as Kashmir.

If the problem of the Durand Line could be resolved, then many of the factors destabilising Afghanistan would disappear. Pakistan would lose one of its main strategic reasons for supporting the Taliban. The opportunities from economic and political development of the tribal territories would divert the energies of the deprived tribesmen from fighting. The tribal territories sit on huge mineral reserves, and stability there would pay a serious peace dividend in the long run. The best solution would be full cross-border administration with the co-operation of all regional actors, and a pooling of sovereignty between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This would allow a coherent approach to security, policing and development which is not currently possible. To break a culturally unified region even further apart by fencing the border without facing the fundamental problem of governance in the Pakistani tribal areas will only cause the troubles there to fester and get worse.